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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[REDACTED]
7 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Near East
and South Asia

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting of 7 November 1980: Security Framework

1. Action Required: None; the following is for your information. (U)
2. Background: The meeting, chaired by Dr. Brzezinski, was the 18th SCC on development of a Security Framework for the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Although the topic scheduled for primary discussion was the DoD paper of 23 October as updated, the meeting was completely devoted to the broad policy and budgetary issues involved in the proposal. (C)
3. Discussion: As preamble Dr. Brzezinski began by stating that the President has committed the US to a policy whose purpose is to ensure security of the region over the next decade. Such a policy is vital and may be the most important legacy of the Carter Administration. The President, he said, must be told that successful implementation is going to be expensive. Furthermore, "before we start looking for new jobs, we owe it to the nation to bequeath the best possible security framework to the new Administration." (S)
4. Secretary Brown then focused the discussion by noting that we cannot off-set the Soviets everywhere principally because we concede them the military initiative - thus our initial moves in most foreseeable power projection situations will be essentially reactive. Without a security assistance program, including MAP, we cannot build the necessary bridges to some strategically important countries. "We need," he continued, "to convince the Congress that FMS and MAP are viable US defense tools and not give-away programs. Unless we are able to forcefully make that point,

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[REDACTED] (P)

we might as well forget the issue." SecDef stated that he well understood that indigenous forces would be unable to stop the Soviets on their own whatever the level of assistance but that credible capabilities to resist aggression were necessary adjuncts to effective US actions. (S/NF)

5. Ambassador Newsom replied that the DOS supported the effort to identify various regional strategic options as well as the thesis that FMS and MAP were necessary. He worried that the levels of enhancement proposed by the DoD paper would have a negative impact on foreign economic aid. Secretary Brown responded that the Congress would likely slash such aid in any case. Dr. Brzezinski then said it was important to quickly tell the President that the SCC considered the matter a key issue and that it would cost more money than was currently budgeted. (S/NF)

6. OMB (John White) entered the conversation which became quite animated and was characterized by a spirited exchange of views. Basically the battle lines were drawn over the mechanism for introducing the desired level of enhancement into the new budget. The majority view - held most strongly by the Pentagon team representatives with some supporting fire from State - was that the enhancement should be presented as a highly visible "add-on" to the budget. This position not only squarely addresses the essentiality of the increase but also makes it immune to departmental or agency juggling. Additionally, this approach would save lower priority programs from any managerial inclination toward rejuggling. (S/NF)

7. OMB responded that insufficient attention was being paid to established budgetary policy and the zero base concept. The budget was characterized as already deeply in deficit and any enhancement for supporting the security framework should be addressed in the context of other needs and priorities. This should, it was argued, be done whether the increase was purely additive or interleaved in the current new budget proposal. OMB's final shot was a strong plea for laying all of these cards on the table along with the proposed enhancement so that the President could decide how "vital is vital." (S/NF)

8. Ambassador Komer counterattacked by strongly implying that without the high visibility implicit in the additive option, "we will continue to be choked by bureaucratic miasma." His recommendation was to give the President the package in relatively gross terms making it clear that it should be done as an "add-on". David Aaron, trying his hand at mediation, entered the discussion saying that while the President should be presented the package as Komer suggested, it was also necessary to lay out the full consequences, including possible effects on other programs. General Jones then pointed out that one component of the 'consequential' presentation should be a recognition that increased MAP funding was contrary to previous Administration policy. OMB agreed and embellished this point with allusions to other potential 'sticky-wickets' such as Egypt-Israel, Greece-Turkey, etc. All agreed these would have to be sketched-in with some detail for the President. (S/NF)

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9. Dr. Brzezinski directed BGen Odom to form an ad hoc working group forthwith to prepare a two or three page paper on the subject which should go to the President within a day or so. Ambassador Newsom cautioned that this paper should keep the Symington-Glemon Amendment in mind. Secretary Brown smiled and said that considering certain comments that "proliferation was none of our business" this should not be too weighty a concern. On that note the meeting ended. No schedule for a follow-on session was announced. ~~(S)~~



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